MODERN TIMES
Art Hobson
ahobson@uark.edu
NWA Times 30 Aug 2008
Russia, NATO, and
getting along with each other
The
West has followed the wrong path with Russia ever since the Soviet Union
collapsed in 1991; this is coming back to haunt us in Georgia.
During
the Clinton Administration there was a debate over NATO's future now that the
cold war was over. Some favored
NATO's expansion into the recently-freed Eastern European nations, while others
argued that expansion wasn't necessary and would only ignite tensions with
Russia, which had always feared Western aggression and which had therefore
sought to dominate the nations on its border as a buffer against the West. These fears had been confirmed by
Germany's surprise attack on the Soviet Union in June of 1941, an attack in
which the Soviet-controlled buffer states of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Eastern Poland, did indeed prove helpful in softening the Nazi blow.
NATO
expansionists won this argument, and in 1997 Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary
joined NATO.
History
could have been different. During
the Soviet Union's final days, Boris Yeltsin (President of Russia during
1991-1999) stunned diplomats with a message "raising the question of
Russia's membership in NATO," and calling such membership a
"long-term political aim."
The West didn't respond.
Yeltsin continued raising this question during the ensuing years, with
no Western response. Even Vladimir
Putin raised this issue, stating during an interview in 2000 that "We
believe we can talk about more profound integration with NATO, but only if
Russia is regarded as an equal partner." Asked if Russia might actually join NATO, Putin responded
"I do not see why not."
He also warned that any attempt to exclude Russia from the debate over NATO's
expansion would only provoke "opposition."
But
during the 1990s Russia remained devastated due to the combined effects of its
prior Soviet history and the chauvinistic efforts of the West to remake the
nation in the image of democratic capitalism. So Russia had no leverage to prevent the 1997 NATO expansion
into Eastern Europe, and a second big NATO expansion in 2004 into seven more of
Russia's neighbors: Latvia,
Lithuania, Estonia (the Baltic buffer states), Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia.
Although
U.S. and Western European officials argued that the 1997 and 2004 expansions
were in no way directed against Russia, the 10 Eastern European nations viewed
matters differently. For them,
NATO was a bulwark against Russia.
We
made a big mistake by expanding NATO without including Russia. Most major geopolitical issues can be
solved only with Russia's help.
Why not maximize Russia's willingness to work with us by offering them
NATO membership? What purpose is
served by maintaining the old cold war isolation of Russia?
Columnist
Tom Friedman wrote a prescient New York Times article on 14 February 2007
arguing that hard-liner Vladimir Putin came to power after the liberal democrat
Boris Yeltsin partly as a consequence of the pressures created by NATO
expansion. Friedman claimed that
NATO expansion "was a bad decision and one that keeps on giving. Just when we need to be getting
Russia's help, we're getting its revenge."
The
West continues pouring gasoline on this smoldering fire. The United States plans to site an
intermediate-range missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic to defend
Europe and the U.S. from presumed future Iranian missiles. The Russians fear, with good technical
and political reasons despite Condoleezza Rice's bizarre dismissal of Russian
concerns as "ludicrous," that these Western missile defenses would
reduce the value of their own nuclear deterrent force and would assist a
Western military buildup against Russia.
The United States recently confirmed this fear by agreeing, at Poland's
urging, to also base short-range Patriot Missiles in Poland. Patriot Missiles are useful only
against aircraft and short-range ballistic missiles, not to shoot down possible
long-range Iranian missiles in mid-course. The Russian Foreign Ministry warned that Moscow's response
would go beyond diplomacy, because the missile system "will be broadened
and modernized" and "lacks any target other than Russian
intercontinental ballistic missiles."
And
we have continued urging two more of Russia's neighbors, Ukraine and Georgia,
located on Russia's southern border and far from the North Atlantic, to join
the "North Atlantic" Treaty Organization.
Friedman's
predicted revenge by Russia is coming true in spades. Russia's attack on Georgia was of course reprehensible; the
conflict should have been handled diplomatically instead of militarily. But we should have expected it. The attack was a tragic event in a
history littered with missed opportunities.
The
world will never find peace until we learn to put ourselves into the shoes of
others. How would we respond if
the Soviet Union had won the cold war, had extended their military alliance to
include western Europe, and now threatened to incorporate Mexico into that
alliance and to base "defensive" missiles in Cuba? No matter how the Soviet Union
protested its own peaceful intentions, I think we would be furious and would
respond with military force.
I
don't expect that a rational suggestion will be listened to amid the finger-wagging
chorus of anti-Russian chest thumping heard in Washington, but I propose that
the U.S. back down from its mistaken plans for missiles in Poland and back down
from its mistaken plans to incorporate Georgia and Ukraine into NATO. Simultaneously, Russia should withdraw
from Georgia, leaving the future of the two disputed provinces to be determined
by an internationally supervised referendum. Then we should offer NATO membership to Russia. I suppose it's far too much to expect
that we might admit our mistakes in this way, and correct them. But it's probably the only way to fix
the mess we've gotten ourselves into over Russia and NATO.